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SLAVERY AND THE HISTORY OF
CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED POWERS
Jeffrey Schmitt*
INTRODUCTION
In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln
declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere
with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I
believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination
to do so.”1 Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War,
Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus”
on slavery.2 According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated
powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery
within the states.3 Legal scholars who support the modern reach
of federal powers have thus conventionally argued that the
Constitution is a living document that changes over time outside
the formal amendment process. Bruce Ackerman, for example,
contends that the constitutional moment of the New Deal
effectively amended the Constitution by expanding the reach of
implied powers.4
A growing number of revisionist scholars, however, argue
that the modern reach of federal powers can be justified without
*

Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I would like to thank
Christopher Roederer, Erica Goldberg, Patrick Sobkowski, and the participants of the
American Constitutional Society Constitutional Law Forum for their helpful feedback and
suggestions.
1. Abraham
Lincoln,
First
Inaugural
Address
(March
4,
1861),
[https://perma.cc/LBV7-NTSZ].
2. See Louisa M. A. Heiny, Radical Abolitionist Influence on Federalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 180, 184-86; Id. at 190-91 (explaining that
it was unclear whether Lincoln could end slavery in the states and that Lincoln had no
intention of changing the “current constitutional structure”).
3. See, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT
THE NATION’S FOUNDING 162 (2018); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING
REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY
16 (Ward M. McAfee ed. 2002).
4. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN: WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (1991).
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resorting to a living Constitution. Scholars like Richard Primus
and David Schwartz look to the history of the founding, early
congressional debates, and Marshall Court decisions to argue that
no subject is off-limits from federal regulation.5 Moreover,
progressive originalists like Jack Balkin contend that the
historical purpose underlying Congress’s enumerated powers is
to empower the federal government to regulate any subject that
the states cannot.6 Many of the most influential scholars in the
field thus contend that constitutional history supports virtually
unlimited federal power.
This Article argues that the revisionist account of federal
powers is inconsistent with the constitutional history of slavery.
In sum, the national consensus—the idea that Congress had no
power to regulate slavery within the states—was a litmus test for
constitutional meaning prior to the Civil War. The Founders,
early Congress, and federal courts all rejected any interpretation
of federal powers that could have justified the regulation of
slavery within the states.7 In particular, the Commerce Clause,
which is the basis for most federal regulation today, did not
empower Congress to regulate intrastate economic activity.8 This
was not because, as is sometimes argued,9 the economy was less
interconnected in the early republic. Instead, Congress and the
courts rejected the modern approach to the commerce power
precisely because southern plantations produced cash crops for
5. See generally DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1-4 (2019)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION]; David S. Schwartz, An Error
and an Evil: The Strange History of Implied Commerce Powers, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 927, 930
(2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, An Error and an Evil]; Richard Primus, “The Essential
Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV.
415, 417 (2018) [hereinafter Primus, The Essential Characteristic]; Richard Primus, The
Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567, 568-69 (2017); Richard Primus, Why
Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2016); Richard Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, 124 YALE L. J. 576, 578-79 (2014); Richard Primus, Reframing Article I,
Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003, 2003-04 (2021).
6. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 140, 155 (2011); Jack Balkin, Commerce,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 78-89.
8. See infra Part III. The National Consensus in the Courts.
9. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the New Deal approach to the Commerce Clause merely “appl[ied] preexisting
law to changing economic circumstances”).
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interstate and internal trade.10 In fact, constitutional objections to
federal power blocked federal initiatives that would be at the core
of the commerce power today, such as the construction of
interstate roads and canals.11 In the constitutional debates over
these projects, slavery always lurked in the background.
Although legal scholars often distinguish historical practices
from constitutional meaning,12 no such legal sleight of hand can
save the revisionist accounts of federal powers. The revisionist
scholars present their theories as being consistent with the
principles of the original Constitution, early congressional
practice, or landmark Marshall Court decisions. In doing so, they
ignore or minimize slavery’s pervasive influence on the original
Constitution. Especially at this time of racial reckoning, legal
scholarship should present an accurate account of how slavery
shaped constitutional history.
In fact, slavery’s ubiquitous influence on the Constitution of
1787 demonstrates why history should not be dispositive in
matters of constitutional interpretation.13 However, as Justice
Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation hearings vividly demonstrate,
the revisionist account threatens to provide moral cover for those
who pretend that originalism is a neutral and bipartisan theory.14
Legal scholars thus should stop advancing implausible historical
arguments in a vain attempt to convince conservative justices to
abandon federalism. Instead, any convincing defense of federal
power requires scholarship that justifies a living Constitution and
convinces the legal community (and public at large) to reverse the
rising influence of originalism. By arguing that slavery was
10. See infra Part II. The National Consensus in Antebellum Politics.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
12. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. &
HIST. REV. 809, 811 (2019) (arguing that constitutional scholars “properly ignor[e] certain
facts” about history when constructing legal doctrine).
13. This Article is not a comprehensive attack on originalism. The many flaws of
originalism have been detailed elsewhere. See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH
(2018). In fact, originalism may be a defensible approach to the Reconstruction
Amendments, which were created with the purpose of eliminating slavery.
14. Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2 Transcript, REV (Oct. 13,
2020), [https://perma.cc/6V5R-ZKL9]. Justice Barrett defended her commitment to
originalism by saying that it “is not necessarily a conservative idea.” In fact, she explained,
“there is a school of . . . progressive originalism” that has gained increasing influence in the
academy.
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central to the structure of the Constitution of 1787, this Article
attempts to accomplish the latter.
This Article is divided into five Parts. Part I examines how
the national consensus on slavery shaped federal powers at the
Founding. Part II explores how slavery influenced Congress’s
understanding of its powers prior to the Civil War. Part III argues
that the national consensus profoundly shaped the Marshall and
Taney Courts’ jurisprudence on federal powers. Part IV
summarizes the revisionist history of federal powers and argues
that it is inconsistent with the constitutional history of slavery.
Part V discusses why this debate is important and explores how
the constitutional history of slavery should shape constitutional
interpretation today.
I. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS AT THE FOUNDING
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
recognized that “the great division of interests in the United States
. . . did not lie between the large & small States: it lay between
the Northern & Southern.”15 Although slavery was a national
institution at the time of the Founding, the Revolutionary War put
it on the path to gradual extinction in the North.16 Many
Americans recognized the hypocrisy of fighting a war for liberty
while denying it to those held in bondage.17 Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island therefore all passed gradual
abolition legislation during the 1780s, and Massachusetts
abolished slavery by judicial decree in 1783.18
In the South, however, slavery was too deeply rooted to be
dislodged by abstract principles of liberty.19 While enslaved
15. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 486 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911).
16. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 261 (2016).
17. Id. at 259-60.
18. Id. at 260; RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 311 (2009). Pennsylvania’s law, for example, only freed people
who were born after its enactment when they reached the age of twenty-eight. Slaves were
therefore expected to pay for their own freedom through decades of forced labor.
19. Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware each debated gradual emancipation proposals
and passed legislation that authorized masters to manumit their slaves without legislative
approval. Virginia even freed slaves who had served in the war for their masters, declaring
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people were less than three percent of the population of the North,
they represented approximately forty percent of the population
and one-third of the wealth of the southern states.20 Not only was
the southern economy dependent on slave labor, but southerners
also could not imagine an interracial society without the
institution.21 Thomas Jefferson expressed a common sentiment
when he said that, if the races lived together without slavery,
“[d]eep rooted prejudices” would cause “the extermination of the
one or the other . . . .”22
The delegates to the Convention therefore understood that
the national government would have no power to interfere with
slavery in the states.23 Several delegates from the Deep South
emphatically declared that their states would never join a union
that threatened the future of slavery. For example, when the
Committee of Detail wrote the first draft of the Constitution,
Charles Cotesworth Pickney of South Carolina warned that, if the
committee failed “to insert some security to the Southern States
agst. an emancipation of slaves” he would “be bound by his duty
to his State” to oppose it.24 Northern delegates were unwilling to
see if the South was bluffing. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut
asserted that the “morality or wisdom of slavery” was a matter
only for “the States themselves,”25 and Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts told the Convention that it “had nothing to do with
the conduct of the States as to Slaves . . . .”26 From the very
that men who “contributed towards the establishment of American liberty and independence
should enjoy the blessings of freedom as a reward for their toils and labours . . . .”
KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 261(quoting BEEMAN, supra note 18, at x).
20. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 266-67.
21. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 15.
22. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 147 (Philadelphia,
Prichard & Hall, 1787). Patrick Henry likewise said: “As much as I deplore slavery, I see
that prudence forbids its abolition” because it was not “practicable, by any human means, to
liberate them without producing the most dreadful and ruinous consequences[.]” 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 590-91 (Philadelphia, Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 1891).
23. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 2; KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 294.
24. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911). Thomas Lynch declared that “[i]f it is debated, whether their slaves are
their property, there is an end of the confederation.” 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 1080 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906).
25. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 364.
26. Id. at 372.
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beginning, the Framers understood that the state governments
would have complete independence on matters relating to slavery
within the states.27
Although the Framers shared a basic assumption that the
new federal government would have no power over slavery, the
Convention was nearly undone over conflicts regarding the
international slave trade and the manner in which slaves would be
counted for representation in Congress.28 As Madison would later
tell Jefferson, South Carolina and Georgia “were inflexible on the
point of the slaves.”29 The Deep South was especially committed
to preserving the international slave trade. John Rutledge of
South Carolina declared: “If the convention thinks that [North
Carolina, South Carolina, and] Georgia will ever agree to the
plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the
expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such
fools as to give up so important an interest.”30 Because the
delegates from these states believed that their way of life
depended on continued access to slave labor, they threatened to
abandon the Union if the Convention did not meet their
demands.31
Bowing to Southern pressure, Northern representatives
struck a deal. They agreed to prohibit Congress from interfering
with the international slave trade for twenty years.32 In exchange,
the South agreed to grant Congress the power to regulate
commerce—a power they feared Congress could use to protect
manufacturing and East Coast shipping interests at the expense of
southern cash crops.33 Although many delegates found the slave
trade immoral, most seem to have agreed with Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut,34 who feared that, without compromise, the states
might “fly into a variety of shapes & directions, and most
27. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 31.
28. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 257-64, 283-86 (discussion of the southern states
asserting that they would not ratify a constitution without protections for slavery).
29. Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 32
(Gaillard Hunt ed., N.Y.: Putnam, 1904).
30. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 373.
31. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 315.
32. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 415.
33. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 287-89.
34. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 369-75.
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probably into several confederations[,] and not without
bloodshed.”35
When pushed on slavery, most delegates
compromised and voted in their self-interest rather than in the
interests of liberty.36
The Framers also sought to protect slavery within the states
with at least two fundamental features.37 The first was the
infamous Three-Fifths Clause, which allocated representation in
the federal government by counting enslaved people as threefifths of a person.38 If slaves had been counted equally, the North
and South would have had roughly the same population at the
time of the Founding.39 The Three-Fifths Compromise ensured
that, although the North would initially have a majority in the
House, the South would not be a helpless minority.40 In fact,
when Gouverneur Morris attacked the Three-Fifths Clause
because it would empower the South to control federal policy,
Pierce Butler responded that “[t]he security the Southn. States
want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which some
gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to
do.”41 Southerners fought for the Three-Fifths Clause in large
part because it gave them the power to protect slavery from
federal overreach.42
The second major structural protection for slavery was the
enumeration of Congress’s powers. Enumeration ensured that the
federal government had no power to interfere with slavery in the
35. Id. at 375.
36. For more detail on these constitutional compromises on slavery, see KLARMAN,
supra note 16, at 270-76, 287, 304; BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 207-18, 316, 326-33;
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 24-28, 32-35, 41; PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 12-18, 25-35 (2d. ed. M.E.
Sharpe Inc., 2001); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 64-73 (Cornell Univ. Press, 1977).
37. Many other provisions protected slavery. Examples include the Fugitive Slave
Clause, the Slave Trade Clause, and the duty to suppress insurrections. PAUL FINKELMAN,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT 13-18 (Harv. Univ. Press
2018); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO
RATIFICATION 6-9 (Hill & Wang 2009).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
39. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 266.
40. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 68-69.
41. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 603-05.
42. Of course, the Three-Fifths Clause also gave the South a larger vote in the Electoral
College. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 301.
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states. When the Virginia delegation first introduced Resolution
VI of the Virginia Plan, Pierce Butler (of South Carolina) feared
that “we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers
of the States,” and he asked Edmund Randolph to explain “the
extent of his meaning.”43 Edmund Randolph, who had introduced
the resolution, “disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers
to the national Legislature,” and insisted that “he was entirely
opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions . . . .”44
Moreover, Luther Martin of Maryland (a small slaveholding
state) invoked slavery to explain why the national government
could not be trusted with such a power.45 Historian Michael
Klarman captures the scholarly consensus when he says that, “[i]t
is likely that every delegate in Philadelphia believed that
regulating a domestic institution such as slavery would exceed the
delegated powers of Congress.”46
The debates over Ratification confirm that the Founders
thought Congress lacked the power to regulate slavery within the
states. Federalist James Iredell, who would later serve as a
Supreme Court Justice, rhetorically asked the North Carolina
ratifying convention: “Is there any thing in this Constitution
which says that Congress shall have it in their power to abolish
the slavery of those slaves who are now in the country?”47 In
South Carolina, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared that the
South had “a security that the general government can never
emancipate them, for no such authority is granted, and it is
admitted on all hands, that the general government has no powers
but what are expressly granted by the constitution.”48 Madison
told the Virginia Ratifying Convention that “[n]o power is given
to the General Government to interpose with respect to the

43. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 53.
44. Id.
45. WALDSTREICHER, supra note 37, at 79.
46. KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 294; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 19
(“Virtually everyone in 1787—and thereafter until the Civil War—fully understood that
Congress could not interfere with the ‘domestic institutions’ of the states . . . .”).
47. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 102 (Philadelphia, Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 1891).
48. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 124
(1788) (John Kaminski ed., 2021) [hereinafter THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
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property in slaves now held by the States.”49 In fact, AntiFederalist Luther Martin of Maryland, an antislavery southerner,
condemned the Constitution on the grounds that the federal
government lacked the power “to make such regulations as should
be thought most advantageous for the gradual abolition of
slavery, and the emancipation of the slaves which are already in
the States.”50
Southern Anti-Federalists generally responded by arguing
that Congress could indirectly undermine or weaken slavery
rather than by saying that the Constitution empowered the federal
government to emancipate directly. At the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, for example, George Mason and Patrick Henry
criticized the Constitution for failing to include any explicit
protection for slavery.51 Mason warned the Virginia ratifying
convention that, without such a protection, Congress could find a
way to undermine slavery, such as a tax on slaves so high “as it
will amount to manumission.”52 Patrick Henry similarly worried
that Congress could use its powers to weaken slavery and thus
slowly eradicate it.53 No prominent politician at the time of the
founding, however, seriously suggested that the Constitution
granted Congress the power to abolish slavery within the states.54
Given the Deep South’s intense commitment to the institution,
Anti-Federalists certainly would have so argued if they could
make even a plausible case for a federal power of emancipation.55
When Anti-Federalists complained that the Constitution
made them complicit in slavery, Federalists generally responded
by saying that slavery was an issue wholly reserved to the states.56
For example, Pennsylvania Federalist Tench Coxe stressed that,
49. Id. at 1339. Madison later said that the Congress could not emancipate slaves
within the states because “[t]here is no power to warrant it, in that paper. If there be, I know
it not.” Id. at 1503.
50. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 142 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
48, at 196).
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id. at 144 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 1338).
53. Id. at 149.
54. Id. at 158 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 1483).
55. See KLARMAN, supra note 16, at 302-03; DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE
COMMERCE POWER: HOW THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED
TO THE CIVIL WAR (2006).
56. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 121.
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because state laws regarding slavery “can in no wise be
controuled or restrained by the fꭀderal legislature,” each state had
the power not only to preserve slavery, but also to abolish it.57
In fact, Federalists who touted the antislavery potential of
the Constitution did not suggest any federal power to regulate
slavery. Instead, they argued that the Constitution put slavery on
the path to extinction by abolishing the international slave trade
and empowering Congress to halt slavery’s expansion into the
federal territories.58 They largely agreed with Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut, who justified the Constitution’s accommodation of
slavery by arguing that, “as population increases; poor laborers
will be so plenty as to render slaves useless[,]” so that “[s]lavery
in time will not be a speck in our country.”59
Although the founding generation agreed that Congress had
no power to regulate slavery within the states, the Constitution
does not explicitly protect slavery. In fact, the Constitution does
not use the term “slave” at all. Even the Fugitive Slave Clause
euphemistically refers to “Person[s] held to Service or Labour,”
and the Three-Fifths Clause counts “free Persons” and “three
fifths of all other Persons.”60 Historians have conventionally said
that the northern delegates wished to hide their complicity with
such an obviously unjust institution.61 In a compelling new book,
however, historian Sean Wilentz argues that there was a much
deeper meaning.62 He convincingly argues that, “the convention
took care to ensure that while the Constitution would accept
slavery where it already existed, it would not validate slavery in
national law[.]”63 Wilentz concludes that the Constitution thus
gave the states complete sovereignty over slavery—the federal

57. Id. at 130 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 836). New
England Federalist William Heath similarly responded to antislavery criticism by stating that
“[e]ach State is sovereign and independent to a certain degree, and they have a right, and will
regulate their own internal affairs.” Id. at 121 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 48, at 1371).
58. Id. at 132-33 (quoting THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 463).
59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 371.
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
61. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at 7-9.
62. Id. at vii.
63. Id. at xiii.
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government had no power to require it in the North or abolish it
in the South.64
In sum, the history of the Founding demonstrates that the
national consensus on slavery was a critical feature of the
Constitution. The records of the Convention make it painfully
obvious that South Carolina and Georgia insisted on some
assurance that the federal government could never abolish slavery
within the states.65 Northerners, however, were unwilling to
protect slavery explicitly, because they hoped that abolition of the
international slave trade, the power to ban slavery in the
territories, and continued white immigration would soon spell the
end of the institution.66 The Convention’s tacit compromise was
thus to empower Congress to ban the slave trade (in 1808) and
control the territories but give Congress no power to regulate the
domestic institutions of existing states. The Framers wrote this
compromise into the text through the enumeration of Congress’s
powers.
II. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN ANTEBELLUM
POLITICS
The national consensus on slavery exerted a powerful
influence on antebellum politics. Because approximately onethird of the southern population was held in bondage, economic
prosperity was heavily dependent on slave labor.67 Moreover,
because whites were paranoid about the possibility of slave
insurrections, they viewed any threat to slavery as a threat to their
personal safety.68 White southerners thus thought their economy,

64. Id. at 6. Wilentz thus emphasizes the antislavery potential of the Constitution.
Although the Constitution did not empower Congress to abolish it directly within the existing
states, Congress had the power to ban it in the territories and prohibit the international slave
trade. He thus argues that the Constitution did not use the word “slave” because many
Founders hoped slavery would quickly wither away.
65. Id. at 69.
66. WILENTZ, supra note 3, at xiii.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 13-15. Even though most white southerners did not own slaves, the potential
to become a slave owner was also an important part of white southern cultural identity. See
JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789-1861: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 12-13 (1963).
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personal safety, and very way of life depended on the
continuation of the institution.
White southerners, however, did not trust the federal
government to protect slavery. In fact, southern distrust of the
federal government increased over time as the population in the
North progressively exceeded that of the South.69 At the time of
the Founding, the southern population was roughly equal to that
of the North, and, although the Three-Fifths Clause decreased
southern representation, the South had 46% of the seats in the
House.70 Southern power in the federal government, however,
consistently decreased over time. By 1860, when Lincoln was
elected president, the southern states held only 35% of the seats
in the House.71 Although it sounds ironic today, white
southerners saw themselves as a minority group that was under
constant threat from a northern majority.72
Southern leaders thus looked to the Constitution for
protection. John C. Calhoun, the architect of nullification and a
leading voice in southern constitutionalism, warned that
legislation like the Missouri Compromise could never protect
southern interests.73 By contrast, he declared, “the Constitution
. . . is a firm and stable ground, on which we can better stand in
opposition to fanaticism, than on the shifting sands of
compromise. Let us be done with compromises. Let us go back
and stand upon the Constitution!”74 When sectional tensions
reached new heights in 1850 over the status of slavery in the
federal territories, then Representative Robert Toombs of Georgia
declared that the North had “brought us to the point where we are
to test the sufficiency of written constitutions to protect the rights
of a minority against a majority of the people.”75 Toombs warned
that the South would “stand by the Constitution and laws” for
protection, and he implicitly threatened secession if federal power
69. CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 12-13.
70. Id. at 22.
71. Id.
72. Another key factor was rising antislavery sentiment in the North, especially in the
1830s. Id.
73. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 453-54 (1847).
74. Id. (statement of Sen. John C. Calhoun).
75. CONG. GLOBE, app. 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1850) (statement of Rep. Robert
Toombs).
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restricted slavery.76 In the words of Jefferson Davis, who would
later become the president of the Confederacy: “Our safety
consists in a rigid adherence to the terms and principles of the
federal compact. If . . . we depart from it, we, the minority, will
have abandoned our only reliable means of safety.”77 In sum, the
national consensus was a central principle of antebellum politics,
and political elites knew that any deviation from it would threaten
the stability of the Union.
The national consensus on slavery, moreover, was not an
isolated exception to otherwise broad federal power. Instead, all
federal powers were interpreted narrowly to preserve state
sovereignty over local economic and social issues, the most
important of which was slavery.78 In fact, southerners saw threats
to slavery from federal legislation that had nothing to do with the
institution, including the bank of the United States, internal
improvements, and tariffs.79 Rather than insist on expansive
federal power, advocates of this federal legislation tried to
reassure southerners that federal power could never threaten
slavery or state sovereignty more generally.80
Congress explicitly disclaimed any power to regulate slavery
within the states as early as 1790.81 The issue first arose when a
group of Quakers petitioned Congress to tax the international
slave trade, prohibit slaves from entering the federal territories,
and otherwise attack slavery “to the full extent of [its] power
. . . .”82 Southern representatives generally agreed with South
Carolina Representative William Loughton Smith, who
responded by asserting that the southern states “never would have
adopted” the Constitution if they thought it empowered the
76. Id. at 201 (statement of Rep. Robert Toombs).
77. Id. at 1614 (statement of Sen. Jefferson Davis); see also CARPENTER, supra note
68, at 141-44, 146 (arguing that most southerners relied on the Constitution to protect
southern rights in this era).
78. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War,
43 RUTGERS L. J. 405, 421, 429-30 (2012) (concluding that the South “insisted on limitations
on the national government precisely because . . . . [n]o other institution was so vulnerable
to hostile legislation at the national level”).
79. See id. at 425.
80. See, e.g., id. at 421, 423.
81. CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 142.
82. See e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1224-26 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); LIGHTNER,
supra note 55, at 38.
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federal government to interfere with slavery.83 Representative
Thomas Tudor Tucker went so far as to declare that the petition’s
“unconstitutional request” to interfere with slavery “would never
be submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war.”84
Although some spoke out in defense of the right to petition and to
end the slave trade in 1808, no one in Congress advocated for a
federal power to regulate slavery.85 The House ultimately voted
to refer the matter to a committee, which issued a report stating:
“Congress ha[s] no authority to interfere in the internal
regulations of particular States” regarding slavery.86
The leading politicians of the North readily admitted that
federal power was too limited to pose a threat to slavery within
the states. Daniel Webster, New England’s leading champion of
federal power, said that “Congress has no authority to interfere in
the emancipation of slaves. This was so resolved by the House in
1790 . . . and I do not know of a different opinion since.”87
Moreover, in his first inaugural address, President Lincoln
likewise declared:
The maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and
especially the right of each State to order and control its own
domestic institutions [i.e., slavery] according to its own
judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power
on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric
depend.88

In fact, no mainstream politician prior to the Civil War publicly
argued that Congress had the power to regulate or abolish slavery
within the states.89
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 82, at 1243-44.
84. Id. at 1240. Many other southern representatives made similar statements. See,
e.g., Richard S. Newman, Prelude to the Gag Rule: Southern Reaction to Antislavery
Petitions in the First Federal Congress, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 571, 582-86 (1996).
85. See Newman, supra note 84, at 588-90. For more on slavery’s influence on the
rights of speech and petition, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
121-22 (Duke Univ. Press ed., 2000).
86. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1465 (1790). Similar resolutions were passed in the House
in 1836 and the Senate in 1838. See CARPENTER, supra note 68, at 142-43.
87. Newman, supra note 84, at 573 (quoting Webster).
88. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents:
Abraham Lincoln, PROJECT GUTENBERG (May 28, 2004), [https://perma.cc/C8UQ-KZ68].
89. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 36.
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Although historians recognize that the country’s intense
commitment to federalism was largely driven by a perceived need
to protect slavery, congressmen often avoided making the
connection explicitly.90 This is because northern and southern
statesmen alike understood that public debate over slavery was
extraordinarily divisive. After the first major debate over
slavery’s expansion in 1820, for example, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, “this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night,
awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the
knell of the Union.”91 When debates over slavery’s expansion
again threatened to tear the country apart in 1850, Stephen
Douglas, the leader of the Democratic Party in the North, pushed
through the Compromise of 1850 and “resolved never to make
another speech upon the slavery question in the halls of
Congress.”92 Although politicians often avoided the subject of
slavery, historian David Currie explains that “the slavery question
often lurked behind Southern insistence on strict interpretation of
federal powers . . . .”93
Slavery impacted every major debate over the reach of
federal power, including the First Congress’s debate over
Congress’s power to incorporate a national bank. Because the
text of the Constitution does not explicitly empower Congress to
incorporate a bank, the debate focused on the scope of implied
powers.94 Madison emerged as the leading opponent of the
bank.95 In sum, he contended that the bank was unconstitutional
because Congress’s implied powers included only those
necessary to effectuate the powers enumerated in Article I.96 He
warned that “[i]f implications, thus remote and thus multiplied,
90. See also id. at 35.
91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, LIBR. CONG. (April 22, 1820),
[https://perma.cc/W8E6-S7TK]. Jefferson lamented that agitation over slavery would
destroy the Union and make the Revolution a “useless sacrifice.” Id. His “only
consolidation” was that he would “not . . . weep over it.” Id.
92. CONG. GLOBE, app. 32d Cong., 1st Sess., app., 65 (Dec. 23, 1850) (statement of
Sen. Stephen Douglas).
93. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS,
1829-1861, at xii (2005); see also SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 5, at 35.
94. See id. at 202.
95. Id. at 203.
96. See id. at 208-09.
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can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach
every object of legislation . . . .”97 Although he did not say so
explicitly, antebellum readers would have understood this as a
warning that the bank bill would set a precedent for federal power
that could threaten slavery.98 In fact, in an obvious reference to
slavery, one representative noticed that “the opinions respecting
the constitution seem to be divided by a geographical line.”99
As some revisionist scholars have stressed,100 many
representatives responded to Madison by arguing that Congress
was not limited to its enumerated powers or that Congress could
legislate for the “general welfare.”101 These men, however, did
not argue that Congress had unlimited regulatory power. Instead,
according to historian Jonathan Gienapp, American elites often
did not view the Constitution “strictly, or even primarily, as a
text” until approximately 1796.102 Many elites thus saw the
Constitution as an abstract set of principles, much like the
unwritten British constitution.103 Under this approach, the text
was merely illustrative of a system that balanced competing
powers and interests rather than strictly enforceable like a
statute.104 Congress thus could legislate according to the spirit, as
opposed to the letter, of the powers enumerated in Article I.105
The debates show that representatives on both sides of the
debate agreed that the spirit of the Constitution limited federal
power so as to preserve state sovereignty over domestic
institutions like slavery.106 William Loughton Smith, a proponent
of the bank, asserted that no one would ever accept the idea that

97. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 86, at 1899.
98. See JOHNATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 207 (2018).
99. Id. at 212.
100. See Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5, at 460-61. Primus’s
arguments are addressed below. See discussion infra Part V.
101. See GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 203, 218.
102. See id. at 10.
103. See id. at 23. Other scholars agree with Gienapp’s assessment. See LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11-12 (2004); see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1990).
104. See GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 62-63.
105. Id. at 92.
106. See id. at 203, 217, 222.
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“whatever the legislature thought expedient was therefore
constitutional.”107 Fisher Ames similarly said that he “did not
contend for an arbitrary and unlimited discretion in the
government to do every thing” and that implied powers must be
“guided and limited.”108 Even Hamilton, the foremost champion
of the bank, acknowledged that some subjects were beyond the
power of Congress and reserved to the states.109 Although the
bank’s supporters had a difficult time articulating the line
between legitimate and illegitimate implied powers,110 it would
be a mistake to assume that there was no such line. The larger
historical context suggests that the bank’s supporters were
attempting to assure men like Madison that the bank bill was no
threat to the national consensus on slavery.
Although the bank’s supporters won the battle over the bank,
they lost the debate over the meaning of the Constitution. In fact,
Gienapp concludes that, as early as 1796, Madison’s textualist
approach to enumerated powers dominated elite thinking.111
Elites thus embraced the idea that Congress was limited to its
enumerated powers (as supplemented by implied powers), which
could be best understood by excavating original meaning.112
Because the national consensus on slavery pervaded the original
meaning of federal powers, this approach to constitutional
meaning dictated that federal powers were narrow in scope.
The debates over internal improvements further reveal
slavery’s ubiquitous influence on federal powers. Today, no one
doubts that Congress can build and regulate interstate
transportation under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.113 In
fact, the modern Court identifies interstate transportation as a core
Commerce Clause concern.114 Before the Civil War, however,
the states and private companies built most roads and canals

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 222.
Id. at 203, 217.
GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 202, 244.
Id. at 222.
See id. at 10, 203.
Id. at 330, 332.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
Id.
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because many political actors thought Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to build internal improvements.115
Using veiled references to slavery, presidents from Jefferson
to Polk cited constitutional concerns when vetoing internal
improvement bills. In 1824, for example, Thomas Jefferson said
that he “most dreaded” a federal power over internal
improvements, because it would imply that Congress could
“make the text say whatever will relieve them from the bridle of
the States.”116 Moreover, in his last act as President, Madison
vetoed a bill to fund improvements (the Bonus Bill of 1817) and
warned that “the permanent success of the Constitution depends
on a definite partition of powers between the General and the
State Governments . . . .”117 As late as 1846, President James K.
Polk warned that “[a] construction of the Constitution so broad as
that by which the power in question [over internal improvements]
is defended tends imperceptibly to a consolidation of power in a
Government intended by its framers to be thus limited in its
authority.” 118 For southerners like Jefferson, Madison, and Polk,
consolidation was dangerous not only because it threatened the
republic, but also because it threatened state sovereignty over
slavery.119
In telling moments, frustrated southern representatives
occasionally tied the constitutional debates over internal
improvements to slavery explicitly.120 Representative John
Randolph of Virginia, for example, warned that, if Congress had
115. See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC
WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 49,
79 (2001).
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (Oct. 13, 1824), in 12 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 380-81 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
117. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents: James Madison, PROJECT GUTENBURG (Jan. 31, 2004), [https://perma.cc/M2787WSL].
118. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents: James Knox Polk, PROJECT GUTENBURG (May 28, 2004),
[https://perma.cc/W2WB-6XLG]. Polk argued that, while longstanding practice allowed the
federal government to build lighthouses and piers near the ocean to facilitate navigation,
Congress could not “advance a step beyond this point . . . to make improvements in the
interior” of the country. Id.
119. Many congressional representatives made the same arguments in debates over
internal improvements. See LARSON, supra note 115, at 67.
120. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 57; see also 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 1299 (1824).
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the implied power to build roads and canals, it could also
“emancipate every slave in the United States.”121 Nathaniel
Macon, a representative from North Carolina and former Speaker
of the House, similarly said, “if Congress can make banks, roads
and canals under the constitution; they can free any slave in the
United States . . . .”122 He thus warned that a broad interpretation
of federal power over internal improvements threatened to
“destroy our beloved mother N[orth] Carolina and all the South
country.”123
Other examples of slavery’s influence on constitutional
politics abound. During the nullification crisis of 1832, John C.
Calhoun argued that Congress lacked the power to impose a tariff
that had a disproportionate effect on the slave states’ cash crop
economy.124 Although President Jackson rejected the theory of
nullification, he devoted his second inaugural address to
reassuring the country that he defended state sovereignty over
local matters. Jackson stated that “the destruction of our State
governments or the annihilation of their control over the local
concerns of the people [i.e., slavery] would lead directly to
revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military
domination.”125 In one of the most famous speeches in the history
of the Senate, Webster similarly argued that southern fear of
federal encroachment on slavery was “wholly unfounded and
unjust” because such an encroachment would “evade the
constitutional compact and [] extend the power of the government
over the internal laws and domestic condition of the states.”126
Southern paranoia around federal power occasionally even
pushed Congress to limit federal protections for slavery. For
example, after Shadrach Minkins escaped from federal custody as
121. 41 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 120, at 1308.
122. EDWIN MOOD WILSON, THE CONGRESSIONAL CAREER OF NATHANIEL MACON
71-72 (1900).
123. Id. at 46-47.
124. See 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT
BAY: 1776-1854, at 255, 257 (1990); The Tariff of Abominations: The Effects, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, [https://perma.cc/MMX5-P3LA] (last
visited Oct. 13, 2021).
125. STATES’ RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 108
(Frederick D. Drake & Lynn R. Nelson eds., 1999).
126. SPEECHES OF HAYNE AND WEBSTER IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ON THE
RESOLUTION OF MR. FOOT, JANUARY, 1830, at 44 (Redding & Co., 1852).
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a fugitive slave in 1851, President Millard Fillmore sought
authorization to call on the federal military and state militia to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act.127 A strange combination of votes
from northern Whigs and southern Democrats, however, led
Congress to deny the President’s request.128 According to
Jefferson Davis:
[W]hen any State in this Union shall choose to set aside the
law, it is within her sovereignty, and beyond our power. . . .
[I]t would be a total subversion of the principles of our
Government if the strong arm of the United States is to be
brought to crush the known will of the people of any State in
this Union.129

The Charleston Mercury similarly warned, “the Boston riot
is to be used, as all Northern outrages are, as the occasion and
pretext for arming the General Government and especially the
Executive, with increased means of assailing the South.”130 In
fact, Senator Robert Rhett of South Carolina even went so far as
to declare that the proslavery Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was an
unconstitutional consolidation of power in the federal
government.131
Although some scholars argue that the Slave Trade Clause
implies a broad Commerce Power, or at least some power to
regulate slavery,132 such arguments rely on a modern reading of
the text rather than constitutional history. The Slave Trade Clause
of the Constitution prohibited Congress from banning the
international slave trade prior to 1808.133 When northern
representatives introduced the first bill to end the trade in January
127. Presidential Speeches: Millard Fillmore Presidency, February 19, 1851:
Message Regarding Disturbance in Boston, MILLER CTR., [https://perma.cc/J6EK-KJXS]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021); See Brendan Wolfe, Minkins, Shadrach (d. 1875),
ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., [https://perma.cc/K492-SR2E] (Feb. 12, 2021).
128. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 828 (1851); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong.,
2d Sess. app. 292.326 (1851).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 599 (1851).
130. The President’s Message, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Feb. 25, 1851. Cf. The
Picayune and Consolidation, NEW ORLEANS DELTA, quoted in DAILY PICAYUNE, Feb. 27,
1851 (arguing that supporters of the president’s proclamation “intended to prepare the public
mind for the idea of an absolute consolidated National Government, built upon the ruins of
State Governments”).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. app. 317–18 (1851).
132. See Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 955.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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of 1807, they “altogether denied” that the Commerce Clause
could apply to slavery.134 Instead, they relied on Congress’s
power to “define and punish offenses against the law of
nations.”135 Using the Commerce power, they asserted, would be
“at war with our fundamental institutions” presumably because it
would imply that Congress could regulate the interstate slave
trade and perhaps even slavery within the states.136
The Slave Trade and Commerce Clauses arose again during
the Missouri Crisis. James Tallmadge, Jr., of New York,
provoked the crisis in 1819 by proposing that Missouri’s
admission to the Union be made conditional on its abolition of
slavery.137 The proposal’s supporters primarily argued that
Congress’s power to regulate the territories and admit new states
authorized Congress to impose conditions on Missouri’s
admission.138 Some northerners, however, also relied on the
Slave Trade and Commerce Clauses.139 Because the Slave Trade
Clause was merely a prohibition on ending the trade for a period
of years, they argued, some other provision of the Constitution
must have granted Congress the power to enact a ban.140 The
most natural source of such power was the Commerce Clause,
which confers power over both international and interstate
commerce.141
Southerners like Madison, however, replied that the Slave
Trade Clause implied only that Congress could ban the
international slave trade.142 If the Framers or Ratifiers had
thought that Congress had a similar power over the domestic slave
trade, Madison contended, the South surely would have
objected.143 Southerners further demanded that Congress allow
134. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 271 (1807).
135. Id.
136. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 45-46. They further stated that it was “abhorrent to
humanity” to call people articles of commerce. Id.
137. See JOHN R. VAN ATTA, WOLF BY THE EARS: THE MISSOURI CRISIS: 1819-1821,
at 1 (2015).
138. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 49.
139. See id. at 49-52.
140. See id. at 51.
141. See id. at 51-52.
142. See From James Madison to Robert Walsh Jr., 27 November 1819, Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, [https://perma.cc/8YHJ-4WLR] (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
143. Id.
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slavery to expand on terms equal to those of free labor.144 The
Missouri Compromise, which allowed slavery in Missouri but
banned it north of the new state’s southern border, did not resolve
the constitutional debate.145 The nation thus could not even agree
on whether Congress could ban slavery in the territories or
regulate the interstate sale of slaves. In this context, it was a basic
assumption that Congress had no power to regulate slavery
directly within the southern states.
Although not as common or well known, some northerners
also sought to limit federal power to preserve a state’s right to
abolish slavery. In his famous senatorial campaign against
Stephen Douglas in 1858 and his successful run for the presidency
in 1860, Lincoln repeatedly warned that a southern-dominated
federal government could force slavery into the North.146 Most
dramatically, after the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the
federal Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional in 1854, it declared
that state sovereignty trumped the power of the United States
Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction.147 In a
concurring opinion, Judge Smith of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
explained that state sovereignty was paramount and warned that,
if the state lacked the power to reject the federal Fugitive Slave
Act, “[t]he slave code of every state in the union [would be]
engrafted upon the laws of every free state . . . .”148 The
Wisconsin legislature adopted the same states’ rights stance, Ohio
nearly followed suit, and northern militia came close to
confronting federal marshals over a state’s right to exclude
slavery.149
In sum, slavery’s influence on antebellum federal powers is
difficult to overstate. On issues ranging from mundane details
like funding for the Cumberland Road to high-profile legislation

144. See VAN ATTA, supra note 137, at 14, 75.
145. See LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 57.
146. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 333 (1976);
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 3, at 451.
147. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 9 (1854).
148. Id. at 122.
149. For more on the Wisconsin decision and its context, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt,
Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315 (2007).
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like the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,150 slavery pushed the country
towards a narrow understanding of federal powers. It is no
accident that, aside from Marbury v. Madison,151 the Supreme
Court did not strike down a single federal statute until the Dred
Scott decision.152
III. THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE COURTS
Slavery also deeply influenced the Court’s jurisprudence on
federal powers. Although the Court, like Congress, often did not
mention slavery explicitly, its influence is unmistakable. The
national consensus on slavery pushed the Court to adopt both a
narrow interpretation of federal authority and a broad
understanding of the states’ police powers.
Although legal scholars have conventionally read Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland as an
endorsement of expansive federal powers,153 his opinion actually
reinforces the national consensus on slavery. In McCulloch,
Justice Marshall provided the definitive interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause while upholding the
constitutionality of the bank of the United States.154 Although the
power to create a bank is not enumerated in Article I, the Court
held that it was implied from the powers to tax, spend, regulate
commerce, and support the armies and navies.155 In an oft-quoted
passage, Justice Marshall said: “Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
150. In the debates over the Fugitive Slave Act, Maryland Senator Thomas G. Pratt
moved to have the federal government indemnify slaveholders when the government failed
to return fugitives. In response, Jefferson Davis, the future president of the Confederacy,
asked: “If we admit that the Federal Government has power to assume control over slave
property . . . where shall we find an end to the action which anti-slavery feeling will
suggest?” See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Courts, Backlash, and Social Change: Learning from the
History of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 123 PENN STATE L. REV. 103, 129-130 (2018).
151. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147-48 (1803).
152. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 414, 416 (1857).
153. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 16-23
(collecting sources).
154. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 324 (1819).
155. Id. at 407.
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are constitutional.”156 He further explained that legislation is
“necessary” when it is “convenient, or useful” in the pursuit of
enumerated powers.157
Chief Justice Marshall, however, was careful to stress that
implied powers were limited in scope. He asserted that the federal
“government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers
granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.”158 For Justice
Marshall, this meant “that the powers of the [federal] government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended.”159 He
further stated that, “[i]n America, the powers of sovereignty are
divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to the other.”160 In other words, Justice Marshall said
that there are topics reserved to the states and thus prohibited from
the federal government. Although Justice Marshall does not spell
out the precise limits on federal power, he clearly contemplates
that federal legislation could be related to an enumerated power
and yet still be inconsistent with “the letter and spirit of the
constitution . . . .”161 As David Schwartz concludes in his recent
book on McCulloch, the language of the decision is “deeply
ambiguous” because it uses vague and indeterminate language
when describing both the scope and limitations of implied
powers.162
Looking beyond the language of the opinion, however, the
historical context strongly implies that the Court in McCulloch
did not have an expansive view of federal powers. The outcome
of the decision was never in question, as Congress had already
extensively debated the issue and the bank had become central to

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 421.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 405.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 421.
See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 5.
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the nation’s economic well-being.163 Yet, the Court decided the
case as the Missouri Crisis raged in Congress, and it had obvious
implications for slavery.164 For a Chief Justice who is famous for
his political acumen when ruling in cases like Marbury,165 it
would have been an especially inopportune moment to declare
that Congress had virtually unlimited federal powers.
In fact, Justice Marshall himself did not view McCulloch as
a precedent for expansive federal powers.166 Soon after the Court
announced its decision, the Richmond Enquirer published a series
of essays arguing that McCulloch’s reasoning threatened to
consolidate power in the federal government.167 In a remarkable
turn of events, Justice Marshall anonymously published a series
of responses in the Philadelphia Union168 and Alexandria
Gazette.169 In the words of legal historian Gerald Gunther:
[T]he thrust of Marshall’s response was to deny that charge
of consolidation, to insist, with more emphasis than in
McCulloch itself, that those principles did not give Congress
carte blanche, that they did preserve a true federal system in
which the central government was limited in its powers—
and that the limits were capable of judicial enforcement.170

For example, in his Friend of the Constitution essay of July
5, Marshall says, “[i]n no single instance does the court admit the
unlimited power of congress to adopt any means whatever, and
thus to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution.”171
163. See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 5 (1969) (“To conclude that the Bank was constitutional was to beat a moribund
horse.”).
164. Id. at 8.
165. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 53.
166. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 353.
167. See GUNTHER, supra note 163, at 55 (“If the Congress of the United States should
think proper to legislate to the full extent, upon the principles now adjudicated by the
supreme court, it is difficult to say how small would be the remnant of power left in the hands
of the state authorities.”). Although the authors used pseudonyms, the essays were probably
written by William Brockenbrough and Spencer Roane, both of whom were prominent
judges on the Virginia Court of Appeals and well-known for their Jeffersonian principles.
Id. at 1.
168. See Gerald Gunther, John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”: In Defense
and Elaboration of McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1969).
169. Id.
170. See Gunther, supra note 168, at 19.
171. Id. at 186-87. He further writes that “not a syllable uttered by the court[] applies
to an enlargement of the powers of congress. The reasoning of the judges is opposed to that
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Moreover, the Marshall Court adopted a narrow reading of
Congress’s implied powers in subsequent cases, rarely cited
McCulloch, and never cited its discussion of implied powers
when deciding other federalism issues.172 If the conventional
view of McCulloch as a precedent for expansive federal powers
is correct, the Court and Justice Marshall seem to have been
completely unaware.
Slavery’s influence on federal powers is perhaps most
evident in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
institution of slavery was deeply embedded within interstate and
international commerce. Slaves primarily produced cash crops
like tobacco, rice, and cotton that were bound for interstate and
international markets.173 Enslaved people were also important
articles of interstate commerce themselves, because masters in the
Upper South sold millions of slaves to fuel development in the
Deep South, where brutal conditions produced high mortality
rates.174 The interstate slave trade was thus key to slavery’s
expansion and an important feature of the southern economy.175
Revisionists who support the modern reach of the Commerce
Clause thus cannot simply rely on changing economic
circumstances.176 Because slave labor was local economic
activity that substantially effected interstate (and international)
commerce, modern doctrine would unquestionably empower
Congress to regulate or abolish slavery.
The antebellum Supreme Court, however, never suggested
that Congress could use the Commerce Clause to regulate any
aspect of slavery. Because Congress did not attempt to regulate
the interstate slave trade, the Court never had occasion to rule on
that issue. However, this lack of federal regulation was no
accident. In Slavery and the Commerce Power, historian David
Lightner concludes, “during both the drawing up of the
Constitution and the battle over ratification, it never entered the
restricted construction which would embarrass congress . . . but makes no allusion to a
construction enlarging the grant beyond the meaning of its ends.” Id. at 182.
172. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 59.
173. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 32.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
176. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 21.
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minds of most southerners that the Constitution gave Congress
the authority to outlaw the interstate slave trade.”177 Lightner
continues to explain that, although a faction of the abolitionist
movement thought Congress could regulate the interstate slave
trade, this position lacked any serious support in national politics
or the judiciary.178
Although the Court never staked out a position on the
interstate slave trade, it broadly interpreted state power over
slavery and clearly stated (albeit in dicta) that the commerce
power could not reach slavery within the states.179 Before
examining the Court’s decisions, however, it is important to
understand the context in which they arose. Each of the cases
discussed below implicate the State’s power to regulate the
interstate movement of people—passengers, immigrants, and
slaves. The Court, however, never ruled on the most contentious
such state law.
South Carolina’s Negro Seaman’s Act required all black
sailors who left their ships in a South Carolina port to be jailed
until the vessel left harbor.180 After Denmark Vesey’s attempted
slave insurrection in 1822, South Carolinians became paranoid
that outsiders, and especially free blacks, would incite revolt by
spreading dangerous ideas of freedom and equality.181 Many
other states followed suit with similar legislation targeting free
blacks and antislavery speech.182 White southerners believed
such legislation was essential to slavery’s survival and thus the
preservation of southern society.183
In Elkison v. Deliesseline, Justice William Johnson
challenged southern control over slavery by ruling that the Negro
Seaman’s Act was unconstitutional.184 While riding circuit,
Justice Johnson held that the law was unconstitutional because
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive
177. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 33.
178. See id. at 59.
179. See id. at 65, 68-69.
180. See id. at 66.
181. See MICHAEL A. SCHOEPPNER, MORAL CONTAGION: BLACK ATLANTIC
SAILORS, CITIZENSHIP, AND DIPLOMACY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 3 (2019).
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
184. 8 F. Cas. 493, 498 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
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in nature.185 Southerners, however, rejected the decision as an
attack on slavery, and South Carolina brazenly continued to
enforce the law.186 In a private letter, Chief Justice John Marshall
criticized Johnson’s decision and worried that Southerners would
“break” the Constitution before they would “submit” to Johnson’s
ruling,187 and the Supreme Court never intervened.
Justice Marshall issued his landmark decision in Gibbons v.
Ogden just one year after Johnson’s controversial decision in
Elkison.188 Gibbons arose from a challenge to an exclusive New
York license to navigate certain waters that connected the state to
New Jersey.189 In his argument for Gibbons, Daniel Webster
argued that the New York licensing law was invalid because, as
Justice Johnson had held while riding circuit, the Commerce
Clause granted Congress an exclusive power over interstate
commerce.190 However, despite Webster’s deserved reputation
as a nationalist, he interpreted the scope of the commerce power
quite narrowly. He acknowledged that a broad view of the
commerce power was possible by saying “[a]lmost all of the
business and intercourse of life may be connected, incidentally,
more or less, with commercial regulations.”191 However, he
rejected the argument that Congress could regulate local matters
merely because they were “connected” to interstate commerce.
Instead, he argued, the Commerce Clause should be interpreted in
light of its underlying purpose. This purpose, he said, was simply
the elimination of “embarrassing and destructive” trade barriers
between the states that had existed under the Articles of
Confederation.192 Interpreting commerce in light of this purpose,
he argued, meant that federal power was limited to the regulation
of trade and navigation.193
185. Id. at 495.
186. SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 47.
187. LIGHTNER, supra note 55, at 66-67.
188. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186 (1824).
189. Id. at 1-2.
190. Id. at 186.
191. Id. at 9-10.
192. Id. at 11.
193. In his article, The Gibbons Fallacy, Richard Primus contends that Webster urged
the Court to hold that Congress had the exclusive power to regulate all “domestic commerce
as one integrated system . . . .” Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 583-84. When
combined with federal exclusivity, Primus says, such a broad reading of the commerce power
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Webster warned that a more expansive interpretation of
commerce would be dangerous to federalism and state
sovereignty. He argued that a broad view of commerce as
extending to all economic activity would:
[A]cknowledge[] the right of Congress, over a vast scope of
internal legislation, which no one has heretofore supposed to
be within its powers. But this is not all; for it is admitted,
that when Congress and the States have power to legislate
over the same subject, the power of Congress, when
exercised, controls or extinguishes the State power; and,
therefore, the consequence would seem to follow, from the
argument, that all State legislation, over such subjects as
have been mentioned, is, at all times, liable to the superior
power of Congress; a consequence, which no one would
admit for a moment. The truth was, he thought, that all these
things were, in their general character, rather regulations of
police than of commerce, in the constitutional understanding
of that term.194

In this quote, Webster is saying that the mere possibility of
federal regulation over local activities was “a consequence which
no one would admit for a moment” because the Supremacy
Clause would allow Congress to overrule the states.195 Of course,
federal supremacy over local conditions would also violate the
national consensus on slavery—something that Webster clearly
invoked when he warned that, if Congress and the states had a
concurrent power over commerce, federal law could overrule
state commercial legislation, including New York’s ban on
slavery.196 He thus urged the Court to view commercial
legislation narrowly, so that the federal government had no power

would have invalidated most state economic legislation. Id. at 584. Webster, however, said
nothing of the sort. The “God-like Daniel” and “Expounder of the Constitution” would never
have made such an impractical argument, and its strains credulity to suggest otherwise. See
ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 9, 162, 613 (1997) (using
Webster’s nicknames). Instead, as explained above, Webster understood that federal
exclusivity would require a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. See Gibbons, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) at 14 (“[T]he words must have a reasonable construction, and the power should
be considered as exclusively vested in Congress, so far, and so far only, as the nature of the
power requires.”).
194. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 19 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id. at 20-21.

2 SCHMITT.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/22 3:22 PM

670

Vol. 74:4

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

to interfere with state legislation enacted under the police
power.197
In Gibbons, Justice Marshall found a way to adopt the basic
thrust of Webster’s argument while still preserving the national
consensus on slavery.198 With Justice Johnson’s recent decision
on the Negro Seaman’s Act likely on his mind,199 Marshall did
not adopt Webster’s argument that the federal commerce power
was exclusive. Instead, he held that New York’s exclusive license
was invalid because it conflicted with a federal steamboat
license.200 The federal license was valid, Justice Marshall held,
because the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to
“prescrib[e] rules for carrying on” the “commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations . . . .”201
Although Justice Marshall held that commerce included
navigation, he followed Webster by saying that the Commerce
Clause did not extend to that “which is completely internal” to a
state.202 This was true, he said, because “[t]he enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the
exclusively internal commerce of a State.”203 In other words,
because the Commerce Clause grants Congress power only over
commerce “among” the states, the text implies that Congress has
no power over intrastate commerce.204 But Marshall did not leave
this point up to implication. He further says that the:
[G]enius and character of the whole government seem to be,
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the

197. Id. at 19-20.
198. Id. at 239-40.
199. See SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 6-7 (asserting that Gibbons and other
Commerce Clause cases “were adjudicated with an eye towards the effects on the Seamen
Acts”).
200. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 24, 27.
201. Id. at 189-90.
202. Id. at 193-95.
203. Id. at 195.
204. Id. Presumably, Justice Marshall must have thought that using the Necessary and
Property Clause to reach internal commerce would similarly violate the text of the Commerce
Clause. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
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States generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular State . . . .205

Marshall continues to say that “[s]uch a power [over
intrastate conduct] would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary.”206 Because Marshall elsewhere uses the word
“convenient” when interpreting the Necessary and Proper
Clause,207 his statement strongly implies that Congress cannot use
that Clause to expand the commerce power to reach intrastate
commerce. If any doubt remained, he further stated: “completely
internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved
for the State itself.”208 As Webster forcefully argued, state power
is not “reserved” when the federal government can overrule state
legislation.209 Gibbons is thus best understood as holding that
Congress’s commerce power, even when supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, did not apply to intrastate
commerce.210
Justice Marshall’s cautious approach to federal powers
should come as no surprise. Marshall was a wealthy Virginian
205. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 194.
207. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
208. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
209. See id. at 31, 34-35.
210. In The Gibbons Fallacy, Primus asserts that Marshall’s opinion is relatively
consistent with modern doctrine on the scope of federal power. See Primus, The Gibbons
Fallacy, supra note 5, at 591. According to Primus, although the Commerce Clause does
not directly extend to intrastate commerce, Gibbons holds that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows Congress to reach local commerce as an implied power. Id. at 574-75.
According to Primus, this distinction was important to Marshall because he believed that the
Commerce Clause made federal power over interstate commerce exclusive, whereas the
Necessary and Proper Clause was not. As a result, the states had concurrent power over local
commerce but no power to interfere with interstate trade. Id. at 591. Although Primus
presents a creative argument, it is not historically accurate. Marshall did not invent an
ingenious argument for federal exclusivity over trade and concurrent authority over local
economic activities, as Primus contends. See id. at 590-92. Instead, Marshall found a way
to adopt the basic thrust of Webster’s argument while still preserving the national consensus
on slavery. See id. at 584-85, 613. As explained above, Justice Johnson had declared that
South Carolina’s Negro Seaman Act was unconstitutional because Congress had the
exclusive power to regulate interstate and international commerce. See supra notes 185-88
and accompanying text. Marshall thought Johnson’s decision was unwise because he knew
that the South would never tolerate any interference with state authority over slavery, and
many Southerners thought restrictions on free blacks were necessary to maintain control over
the enslaved. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. Although Marshall said that
Webster’s argument for exclusivity had “great force” he was probably unwilling to adopt it
because of the national consensus on slavery. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209.
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who bought and sold hundreds of enslaved people throughout his
lifetime.211 According to historian Paul Finkelman, “in slavery
cases, Marshall’s opinions were cautious, narrow, legalistic, and
hostile to freedom.”212 Moreover, in his biography of Justice
Marshall, Kent Newmyer similarly states that Marshall’s
approach to “federalism deferred to the states on the question of
slavery.”213 Justice Marshall probably had no inclination to
challenge state sovereignty over slavery through an expansive
interpretation of implied federal powers. When Marshall said that
federal legislation must be consistent with the “spirit of the
constitution,”214 he may very well have had state sovereignty over
slavery on his mind.
The Taney Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
similarly supported the national consensus on slavery. In Mayor
of New York v. Miln, the Court broadly interpreted the state’s
police power to include the power to regulate the entry of
immigrants because doing so was necessary to guard against the
introduction of “moral pestilence” as well as physical disease.215
The reference to “moral pestilence” was not lost on the southern
states, which had used similar language to justify racial
“quarantine” laws like the Negro Seamen Acts and prohibitions
on abolitionist literature.216 In fact, New York warned the Court
that any ruling against its immigration law would call into
question “a class of laws peculiar to the southern states,
prohibiting traffic with slaves, and prohibiting masters of vessels
from bringing people of colour in their vessels.”217 Slavery thus
pushed the Court in Miln to interpret state police powers broadly
and to reject federal exclusivity over the entry of immigrants.218
The Taney Court returned to the issue of slavery and the
Commerce Clause in Groves v. Slaughter.219 The case arose
211. FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 31.
212. See id. at 28.
213. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 434 (La. St. Univ. Press 2001).
214. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819).
215. 36 U.S. 102, 142-43 (1837).
216. See SCHOEPPNER, supra note 181, at 106-07.
217. Miln, 36 U.S. at 109.
218. See id. at 111-12.
219. 40 U.S. 449, 464 (1841).
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when Moses Groves purchased slaves from Robert Slaughter and
used a promissory note as partial payment.220 Groves, however,
claimed that the note was invalid because Mississippi’s
constitution stated, “[t]he introduction of slaves into this state, as
merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the
first day of May, 1833.”221 Despite the plain meaning of the text,
the Court held that the Mississippi Constitution was not selfexecuting and thus, required legislation to go into effect.222 The
Court thus bent over backwards to avoid ruling on slavery.223
Justice John McLean of Ohio, however, wrote separately to
address the parties’ argument that federal power over interstate
commerce was exclusive.224 McLean was easily the most
antislavery justice on the Court, and he would later dissent in the
Court’s two most consequential proslavery opinions: Prigg v.
Pennsylvania225 and Dred Scott v. Sanford.226 Justice McLean
declared that “[t]he power over slavery belongs to the states
respectively. It is local in its character, and in its effects[.]”227 A
state therefore could ban the sale of slaves into its territory
because “the transfer or sale of slaves cannot be separated from
this power” over slavery.228 Although a state could not ban the
importation of cotton or fabrics from other states, McLean said,
the sale of slaves was different because “the Constitution acts
upon slaves as persons, and not as property.”229 Moving beyond
doctrine, he went so far as to declare that a state’s power to ban

220. Id. at 455.
221. Id. at 451-52.
222. Id. at 500-01.
223. Id.
224. Groves, 40 U.S. at 503-04.
225. 41 U.S. 539, 658 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting).
226. 60 U.S. 393, 545 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting). Antislavery leader Salmon P.
Chase said Justice McLean was “a good man and an honest man, [whose] sympathies [were]
with the enslaved.” Salmon P. Chase, Letter to Charles Sumner (April 24, 1847), in 2 THE
SALMON CHASE PAPERS 149 (John Niven, ed. 1994). Chase would later serve as the
Governor of Ohio, U.S. Senator, Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln, and Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. For more on McLean, see generally FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
(1937).
227. Groves, 40 U.S. at 508.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 507.
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slavery was “higher and deeper than the Constitution.”230
McLean’s opinion shows why the federal consensus was nearly
universally accepted—it not only protected slavery in the South,
but it also preserved freedom in the North.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney felt compelled to respond.231
Like Justice McLean, he said that the power to regulate slavery
“is exclusively with the several states[.]”232 Taney elaborated that
the states had the exclusive power “to determine their condition
and treatment within their respective territories: and the action of
the several states upon this subject cannot be controlled by
Congress, either by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or
by virtue of any power conferred by the Constitution of the United
States.”233 Taney did not justify his conclusion by saying that
there was a slavery exception to the Commerce Clause. Instead,
he said that Congress’s commerce power was so narrow that “the
regulations of Congress, already made, appear to cover the whole,
or very nearly the whole ground[.]”234
This Article’s discussion of slavery’s impact on the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is one, admittedly incomplete,
example of slavery’s influence on the Constitution. However,
this example shows that the Court was unwilling to interpret
federal power in a way that could challenge the national
consensus on slavery.

230. Id. at 508.
231. See id.
232. Grover, 40 U.S. at 508.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 509. Justice Baldwin also wrote separately, though he concluded that, if the
Mississippi ban on importing slaves were self-enforcing, it would violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. See id. at 515-17. He narrowly defined “‘[c]ommerce among the states,’
as . . . ‘trade,’ ‘traffic,’ ‘intercourse,’ and dealing in articles of commerce between states, by
its citizens or others, and carried on in more than one state.” Id. at 511. He distinguished
this from the police power of the states, which, he said, “relates only to the internal concerns
of one state, and commerce, within it . . . .” Grover, 40 U.S. at 511. He further explained
that slavery within the states was “a matter of internal police, over which the states have
reserved the entire control; they, and they alone, can declare what is property capable of
ownership . . . .” Id. at 515. Justice Baldwin thus concluded that, although the Commerce
Clause extended to the interstate traffic in slaves, it could not reach intrastate economic
activity. See id. at 515-17.
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IV. THE REVISIONIST HISTORY OF FEDERAL
POWERS
The revisionist history of federal powers is a story of
constitutional redemption. According to this story, the Framers
created a national government that was capable of solving every
problem that required a national solution. The Marshall Court
then broadly interpreted federal power in canonical cases like
McCulloch and Gibbons. The proslavery Taney Court, however,
retreated from the true meaning of the Constitution by artificially
limiting federal power to protect state sovereignty over slavery.
The Court later continued to limit federal power to facilitate the
retreat from Reconstruction and establishment of Jim Crow.
When the Court dramatically expanded federal power in the New
Deal era, it was returning to the principles of the original
Constitution and the logical implications of the Marshall Court’s
great decisions. Although the revisionists tell a nice story, it is a
work of historical fiction.
A. The Enumeration Principle
A growing number of revisionist scholars argue that the
enumeration of Congress’s powers in Article I should not be seen
as a limitation on the scope of federal authority.235 These
revisionists acknowledge that Article I and the Tenth Amendment
limit Congress to its enumerated powers.236 They argue,
however, that Congress’s enumerated powers are broad enough
to leave nothing beyond the reach of the federal government.237
235. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 56; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 932; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 415-16; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 567;
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 1-4; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration,
supra note 5, at 576; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at 2003-05.
236. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at
26, 29; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 938; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 496; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 571;
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 6-7, 24; Primus, The Limits of
Enumeration, supra note 5, at 581-82, 629-30; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra
note 5, at 2007, 2010.
237. See generally SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 56; Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 932; Primus, The Essential
Characteristic, supra note 5, at 415-16; Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, supra note 5, at 567;
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In doing so, they challenge the conventional wisdom and
reasoning of several modern Supreme Court decisions that limit
the scope of the federal Commerce Power.238 In NFIB v. Sebelius,
for example, Chief Justice Roberts contends that “[t]he
enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because
‘[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’”239 I
will refer to this idea as the “enumeration principle.” Legal
scholars have advanced at least three different lines of reasoning
to argue that history does not support the enumeration principle.
None of these arguments, however, withstands scrutiny.
1. The Unimportance of Enumeration
Richard Primus, who has written several articles on the
enumeration principle,240 contends that we can be faithful to the
Founders’ design while still rejecting the enumeration principle
because the Founders cared far more about process limits—such
as elections and separation of powers—than doctrinal limitations
on federal power like enumeration.241 He further asserts that the
public rejected enumeration as an adequate safeguard for
individual rights when it demanded a bill of rights that would
impose external constraints on federal power.242 Because the
Founders’ real concern was in limiting federal power and
preserving individual rights, he argues, we can abandon the
enumeration principle in favor of more important process limits
and external constraints.243
As demonstrated above, however, white southerners saw
enumeration as a critical component of the Constitution’s
Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5, at 2-4; Primus, The Limits of Enumeration,
supra note 5, at 576; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at 2004-05.
238. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); see also NFIB v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 532-37 (2012).
239. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 534 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195
(1824)).
240. See e.g., Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5; Primus, The Gibbons
Fallacy, supra note 5; Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, supra note 5; Primus, The Limits
of Enumeration, supra note 5; Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5.
241. Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, supra note 5, at 615-17. Primus calls this the
“internal-limits canon.”
242. See id. at 617-18.
243. See id. at 623-25.
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protections for slavery, and complete state sovereignty over
slavery—i.e., the national consensus—was perhaps the most
fundamental principle of the antebellum constitutional order.244
It may be true that some delegates to the Constitutional
Convention thought that the Three-Fifths Clause and Slave Trade
Clause were more significant,245 but the historical record shows
that most Founders were adamant about limiting the scope of
federal power.246
Moreover, public concern over the adequacy of enumeration
does not suggest that it was rejected or that it was so unimportant
that it can be ignored. Instead, history shows only that the
Framers sought overlapping devices to protect liberty, including
the separation of powers, enumeration, and the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the people did not trust any single method to protect
liberty does not mean that we can ignore any of them today.247
2. Rejection of Textualism
Scholars also object to the enumeration principle by pointing
out that some Founders and members of the early Congress did
not see the text as an enforceable document.248 Early uncertainty
about the nature of the Constitution, however, provides little
reason to reject the enumeration principle today. Although the
contested nature of constitutional meaning in the eighteenth
century is fascinating from the standpoint of history, the fact
244. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
245. In Reframing Article I, Section 8, Primus specifically addresses slavery’s impact
on the constitutional convention. Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, supra note 5, at
2021-24. Following his earlier work, Primus argues that enumeration was not important to
southern delegates because they counted on structural provisions like the Three-Fifths Clause
to protect slavery. See id. However, Primus’s argument does not seriously engage with the
national consensus on slavery after the Founding.
246. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
247. A hypothetical may help to illustrate the point. Suppose that the Constitution had
originally granted a police power to Congress along with a bill of rights. Suppose further
that the people ratified the Constitution only on the understanding that subsequent
amendments would limit Congress to a list of enumerated powers. Under this hypothetical,
would it make sense to say that the courts could ignore the bill of rights in the original
constitution? Although such an argument would be highly problematic, it is like Primus’s
argument in every way that matters.
248. See Primus, The Essential Characteristic, supra note 5, at 462-69; SCHWARTZ,
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 25.
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remains that the textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation, i.e., reading the text like an enforceable statute,
won out in Congress and the Courts by the turn of the nineteenth
century.249 More fundamentally, as explained above, even the
representatives who viewed the Constitution as an abstract
framework did not think that it was infinitely malleable.250
Although many representatives in the 1790s believed that the
Constitution merely created a framework for government,
complete state sovereignty over local economic activities was a
central component of that framework. There is simply no
historical evidence that any prominent public figure thought the
federal government had the power—enumerated or not—to
regulate slavery within the states.251 In other words, although
some representatives briefly rejected the enumeration principle in
the 1790s, none seem to have rejected the national consensus on
slavery or the fact that federal power was inherently limited.252
3. Slavery as an Exception to Inherently Broad Federal Powers
In The Spirit of the Constitution, David Schwartz attempts to
reconcile the conventional reading of McCulloch with the
constitutional history of slavery.253 According to Schwartz, the
Marshall Court “retreated from the more expansive ideas of
implied powers expressed in McCulloch” to keep the Court out of

249. GIENAPP, supra note 98, at 203.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 73-84. For example, Fisher Ames, a
proponent of the Bank and unenumerated powers, said that “he ‘did not contend for an
arbitrary and unlimited discretion in the government to do everything. . . .’” See GIENAPP,
supra note 98, at 203.
251. Although some representatives argued that Congress had the power to “legislate
in the general interest” during the bank debate. Id. at 210. The national consensus on slavery
implies that this “general interest” was distinct from local activities. In fact, many of the
bank’s defenders argued that Congress’s implied powers should be limited to national objects
that the states could not regulate. Id. at 218. Moreover, it is probably no coincidence that
southerners generally favored a narrower and textualist approach to federal powers during
the debate. Id. at 212.
252. See id. at 222 (Ames), 227-28 (Madison), 244 (Hamilton).
253. Although Schwartz acknowledges that McCulloch is “deeply ambiguous,” he
somehow concludes that “the logic of implied powers spelled out in McCulloch could, when
applied to the Commerce Clause, justify all present-day federal regulation of the economy.”
SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 4-5, 23.
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the growing controversy over slavery.254 The Taney Court, he
further asserts, then sought to “protect the constitutional position
of slavery” by “in essence, not overruling but actually reversing
the direction of McCulloch.”255 The Court’s doctrine of “reserved
state powers,” he further contends, emerged to accommodate state
control over slavery and Jim Crow.256 Schwartz thus argues that
the enumeration principle—the idea that there must be something
Congress cannot regulate—is an artificial constraint that should
be rejected as a relic of constitutional evil.257 In other words, he
concludes that, because slavery was an external constraint on
otherwise broad federal power, the Thirteenth Amendment
requires us to reject slavery’s influence on the Constitution and
return to a broad understanding of federal powers.258
Schwartz, however, gets it exactly backwards. Slavery did
not operate as an external constraint on otherwise broad federal
power. Instead, slavery was a powerful motivation for the
antebellum consensus that all federal powers were inherently
limited in scope. The abolition of slavery thus did not open the
way to a return to strong federal powers, because federal powers
were never understood to be expansive in the first place.259
Although abolition should have reduced the motivation to limit
federal powers in the future, it did not change the historical fact
that federal powers had always been limited in scope. Any
expansion of federal power thus must arise from the new powers
granted in the Reconstruction Amendments or an evolving (i.e.,
non-originalist) understanding of federal powers under the

254. Id. at 5, 87-88.
255. Id. at 87-88.
256. Schwartz, An Error and an Evil, supra note 5, at 933.
257. Id. at 934. Schwartz derisively calls the enumeration principle the
“‘mustbesomething’ rule.” Id. at 939.
258. See SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 98 (“[S]ome
of the justices seemed to view slavery as legally unique—as though there were a slavery
exception to the Commerce Clause . . . .”).
259. In fact, Schwartz acknowledges that Marshall’s decision in McCulloch was
ambiguous and could be read to endorse a more limited approach to federal powers. Id. at
5. After discussing the case, however, the remainder of the book appears to assume that the
nationalist reading of the decision is correct. If the narrower reading of the case is correct,
as this Article argues, then the Court did not “retreat” from anything. Instead, subsequent
Marshall and Taney Court decisions were perfectly consistent with both the founding and
McCulloch.
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original Constitution. Pretending otherwise is an attempt to write
the history of slavery out of the Constitution.
B. Living Originalism: Text and Principle
Focusing on the history of the Founding, progressive
originalists like Jack Balkin similarly argue that constitutional
history supports a virtually unbounded approach to federal
powers.260 In his book, Living Originalism, and a series of related
articles, Balkin advances a method of constitutional interpretation
he calls “text and principle.”261 As he explains, “[t]he basic idea
is that interpreters must be faithful to the original meaning of the
constitutional text and to the principles that underlie the text.”262
In referring to the “original meaning of the constitutional text,”
Balkin means the semantic or linguistic meaning of the words in
context.263 After finding this original linguistic meaning, he
argues, courts should construct doctrine that advances the text’s
underlying principles.264 These principles, he asserts, should be
defined broadly to create a framework that can change and adapt
over time.265 Under his approach, therefore, the Framers’
expectations of how the text would apply to concrete issues are
not binding today.266
Balkin contends that the principle underlying Congress’s
enumerated powers, including the Commerce Clause, is “to give
Congress power to legislate in all cases where states are
separately incompetent or where the interests of the nation might
be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.”267 He
draws this principle from Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan,
260. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 138-40, 143, 146, 298; see
Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 3, 6, 12, 16-18; see Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551, 567-75 (2009); see Jack Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292, 297-98 (2007).
261. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 3.
262. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 260, at
551-52.
263. Id. at 551-52.
264. Id. at 553-54.
265. Id. at 553-59.
266. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 4-5.
267. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 6, at 140; Balkin, Commerce, supra
note 6, at 6.
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which Edmund Randolph introduced at the Constitutional
Convention.268 According to Balkin, the Committee of Detail
drafted Congress’s enumerated powers to effectuate this
principle, and Federalists like James Wilson used it to explain the
nature of federal power during the Ratification debates.269
The Founders, however, rejected Resolution VI precisely
because it violated state sovereignty and the national consensus
on slavery.270 As delegates like Pierce Butler of South Carolina
immediately recognized, Congress could have used Resolution
VI to justify the abolition of slavery by asserting that abolition
was in the national interest.271 In fact, it was commonly argued
that the threat of slave insurrections posed a threat to national
security, especially during times of war with foreign powers.272
As historians recognize, the Convention did not accept the
substance of Resolution VI; instead, the delegates voted to
approve it only as a placeholder so that the Convention could
move forward.273 The Framers did not even mention Resolution
VI when debating the scope of the powers drafted by the
Committee of Detail, and there is no record of its mention during
the debates over Ratification.274 The enumerated powers were not
meant to reflect Resolution VI because the Framers understood
that, to preserve state sovereignty (over slavery), Congress’s
powers must be limited in scope.
Although it may be difficult to admit, the national consensus
on slavery was part of the principle underlying Congress’s
enumerated powers. As detailed above, the Founders agreed that

268. Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 8-9.
269. Id. at 8-10.
270. Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve
Collective Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 213435, 2137-39 (2012).
271. As explained above, when Resolution VI was first introduced, Pierce Butler (of
South Carolina) feared that “we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of
the States . . . .” I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, at 53.
Later in the debates, Butler explained that “[t]he security the Southn. States want is that their
negroes may not be taken from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a
very good mind to do.” Id. at 605.
272. Schwartz, An Error and An Evil, supra note 5, at 995-96.
273. Lash, supra note 270, at 2134; JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 177-78 (1996).
274. Lash, supra note 270, at 2138-39.
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Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the states. This
was true in the North as well in the South, during the Convention
and Ratification, and even among the most antislavery of the
Founders.275 The principle underlying federal powers thus could
better be stated as follows:
Congress has the power to legislate in all cases where states
are separately incompetent or where the interests of the
nation might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state
action (i.e., Resolution VI); provided, however, that the
states have complete and exclusive autonomy over intrastate
activities, regardless of their effects on interstate commerce
(i.e., the national consensus on slavery).

Of course, this principle is a relatively accurate statement of
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence prior to the New
Deal. It is also similar to the principle that Daniel Webster—the
nationalist “Expounder of the Constitution”—identified as a
lawyer in Gibbons.276 Although post-ratification history is
certainly not dispositive, this consistency is no coincidence. As
Balkin himself admits, post-ratification history is circumstantial
evidence of both text and principle.277 His failure to engage
seriously with the history of slavery in his work on living
originalism is thus particularly striking.
Balkin might object that the “principle” underlying the
Commerce Clause should be defined at a higher level of
generality than the national consensus on slavery. His theory
“views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance
that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over time
through constitutional construction. The goal is to get politics
started and keep it going (and stable) so that it can solve future
problems of governance.”278 The national consensus on slavery,
however, is just this type of framework principle. Rather than
straitjacket constitutional meaning for all issues, it would simply
275. As explained above, opponents of slavery hoped that ending the international
slave trade and empowering Congress to ban slavery’s expansion into the territories would
destroy the institution.
276. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824). For more on Webster,
see REMINI, supra note 193, at 28-29, 162.
277. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 260, at
551-52.
278. Id. at 550.
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dictate the division of authority between the state and federal
governments. The Framers also saw it as a necessary condition
of ratification and peace within the Union.
Although the division of power dictated by the national
consensus may not fit Balkin’s policy preferences, produce
normatively desirable results, or match modern doctrine, it is hard
to explain why it is wrong under his theory of constitutional
interpretation. Balkin’s text and principle method purports to
look for the actual historical principles that guided the
Founders.279 Of course, the Founders also wanted to produce an
effective and just government. If these are seen as the underlying
principles, however, his method would better be called “text and
free-floating concepts of justice.” However, this would eliminate
any recognizable form of originalism from his theory of Living
Originalism.
Balkin takes other theories of originalism to task for their
inability to explain constitutional progress on issues like
segregation, women’s rights, and federal power.280 He also
argues that Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional change is
unnecessary because the New Deal’s expansion of federal power
is perfectly consistent with the “Constitution’s original meaning,
its text, or its underlying principles.”281 His theory, however,
explains the reality of expansive federal power only by ignoring
the most obvious candidate for the actual principle underlying the
Commerce Clause and by fabricating an expansive alternative
that has little basis in history. Of course, using the national
consensus on slavery as a fundamental principle to interpret the
Constitution today would strike most people as illegitimate. It is
slavery’s very illegitimacy, however, that demonstrates why
constitutional doctrine should not be bound by the principles (or
intent) of the people who wrote and ratified the Constitution of
1787.

279. Id. at 551-53.
280. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 6, at 2.
281. Id. at 4.
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V. SLAVERY, ORIGINALISM, AND THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION
The scope of federal powers is one of the most significant
issues in constitutional law. In NFIB, the Supreme Court came
within one vote of striking down the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”), perhaps the most significant federal legislation of the
twenty-first century.282 In fact, by making Medicaid expansion
voluntary with each state, the Court invalidated a central
provision of the ACA and effectively prevented millions of
Americans from getting health insurance.283 The Justices who
voted against the ACA did so to protect “the independent power
of the States” in our federal system.284
The Obama
Administration’s expansive view of federal power, Chief Justice
Roberts warned, “would . . . permit[] Congress to reach beyond
the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.’”285 The Roberts Court could use the same reasoning to
strike down any new legislation that expands the role of the
federal government or its oversight of state programs. Just as the
Hughes Court gutted the New Deal before 1936,286 the Roberts
Court could impede urgently needed federal action on issues
ranging from climate change to pandemic relief.
The revisionist attempt to forestall this result is
understandable. History is influential to the Roberts Court, and
this is particularly true with respect to its federalism
jurisprudence.287 However, it is extremely unlikely that the
revisionist history of scholars like Balkin, Primus, or Schwartz
will convince the Justices to change course. Groundbreaking
work on the history of the Second Amendment, affirmative
action, and state action doctrine, to name just a few examples,
282. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 524 (2012).
283. Id. at 588, 599.
284. Id. at 536.
285. Id. at 554 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
286. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 201-02
(1994).
287. See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 533-34; Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854
(2014).
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have had little influence on the Court, notwithstanding the fact
that it is painstakingly researched and historically accurate.288
There is little reason to think that a highly contested revisionist
history of federal powers will fare any better. In fact, even the
Court’s self-identified originalist justices often ignore history
when it does not favor their preferred results.289
Moreover, at this moment of racial reckoning, with
widespread protests against systemic racism and a national debate
over teaching critical race theory, legal scholarship should not
ignore the constitutional history of slavery. The revisionist
history sees slavery as a temporary aberration that can be easily
excised from the Constitution, leaving a coherent and workable
framework for modern life. However, the hard truth is that it is
impossible to understand the Constitution of 1787 without
appreciating the pervasive influence of slavery. Because of the
South’s insistence on complete state autonomy over slavery—the
foundation of its social and economic system—federal powers
were extraordinarily narrow in scope. Pretending otherwise
threatens to obscure the country’s history of racial injustice and
treat it as a phenomenon of the past. The struggle for racial
justice, however, requires a clear-eyed view of the past of white
supremacy and its continuing effects.290 Without such an honest
assessment, the continuing structures of systemic racism can
never be eliminated.291
Recognizing slavery’s influence on the Constitution is not
only necessary to address the legacy of racial injustice, but it also
presents a powerful argument against any theory of constitutional
interpretation that makes historical purpose, principles, beliefs, or
practices dispositive of constitutional meaning.292 Any such
288. See, e.g., Chris Schmitt, Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33, 51-52 (2018); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV.
753, 798 (1985).
289. See SEGALL, supra note 13, at 3, 6-7, 169.
290. See, e.g., Charles W. McKinney, Jr., Beyond Dreams and Mountains: Martin
King’s Challenge to the Arc of History, 49 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 263, 282-83 (2018).
291. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our
Racial History, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 31 (2004) (“The historic serves as a guide to
understanding the present.”).
292. This does not describe all originalist methods of interpretation. An originalist
who believes in the distinction between interpretation and construction may not view historic
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theory must view modern constitutional doctrine, which allows
Congress to regulate local economic matters because they effect
interstate commerce, as illegitimate. Countless federal laws that
enjoy overwhelming public support, ranging from civil rights
protections to criminal laws against child pornography, are thus
unconstitutional from the standpoint of originalism. Admittedly,
most originalists argue that the courts should uphold nonoriginalist precedent under certain circumstances.293 The fact
remains, however, that most federal legislation would be
constitutionally suspect, and the Court may strike down any new
legislation that would expand federal power. An originalist Court
thus could strike down new legislation on critical issues requiring
a national solution, such as medical care or climate change, to
preserve a system that the Founders designed to protect state
autonomy over slavery. Stated simply, understanding the
constitutional history of slavery demonstrates why no one should
accept a strong version of originalism today.
Once originalism is rejected, it is far easier to articulate a
principled justification for a broad view of federal powers. As a
matter of text and logic, Primus’s critique of the enumeration
principle is correct. Rejection of the enumeration principle,
however, requires a dynamic approach to constitutional meaning.
While Primus’s theory may be faithful to the values of liberty and
limited government, it is not faithful to the historical
understanding of the Constitution. He undermines his larger
argument by saying otherwise.
Similarly, there is much to recommend in Balkin’s work on
text and principle. It works well for individual rights protections
that are stated at a high level of generality and that reflect
fundamental shared values, especially those in the Reconstruction
Amendments. As Balkin explains, our conception of how these
fundamental values apply to concrete issues changes over time.
For example, although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
purpose or practices as dispositive. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SOLUM & ROBERT BENNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 3 (2011). Of course, this critique also would
not apply to an originalist approach to the Reconstruction Amendments.
293. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007). However, the fact remains all such federal
legislation would be constitutionally illegitimate from an originalist standpoint.
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thought that segregation was consistent with equal treatment,294
this original expected application is not binding today. As the
Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, we now know that
segregation is incompatible with the principle of equality.295
However, Balkin is wrong to extend the text and principle
approach to the federal powers contained in the Constitution of
1787. This is because, rather than reflecting a fundamental shared
value like equality, the structure of federal powers reflected a
compromise that gave the states complete sovereignty to abolish
or protect slavery. In other words, the Founders sought to
preserve a state’s power to structure its social and political
institutions to enforce white supremacy. A dynamic, “living”
approach to constitutional interpretation thus is the only
legitimate approach to federal powers.
CONCLUSION
Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison famously condemned
the Constitution as a “covenant with death” and an “agreement
with Hell.”296 As Garrison recognized more than 150 years ago,
slavery exerted a profound influence on the structure of the
Constitution and its subsequent interpretation. In fact, from the
founding period until the Civil War, there was a national
consensus that the federal government had no power to interfere
with slavery in the states. Because slavery was a central
component of the country’s economic and social order, the
national consensus dictated that Congress’s powers were far more
limited in the past than they are today. In particular, American
elites agreed that Congress had no power to regulate local
activities merely because they had an effect on interstate
commerce. If Congress could regulate working conditions,
wages, or production, it could abolish slavery as well. Any theory
of constitutional interpretation that looks to original intent,
underlying principles, or early constitutional history therefore
must account for the national consensus on slavery.
294. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5-6 (2006).
295. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
296. See FINKELMAN, supra note 37, at 11.
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There is an obvious injustice to using the national consensus
on slavery to interpret the Constitution. After all, slavery was
profoundly unjust, and the country fought its bloodiest war to see
it formally eliminated in the Thirteenth Amendment.297
Whitewashing constitutional history, however, is not the answer.
Instead, legal scholars should plainly acknowledge that the
Constitution’s basic meaning has changed over time. The living
Constitution should be celebrated and defended, not obscured by
a revisionist history that minimizes the Constitution’s complicity
with slavery.

297. Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S.
SENATE, [https://perma.cc/LXD6-MWFB] (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).

